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Abstract
I use a structural matching model, North Carolina public school data, and a survey of
teachers’ career plans to analyze schools’ and teachers’ behaviors in the teacher
transfer market. Results show that mid-career teachers with better pre-service
qualifications are the most eager to search, different types of teachers and schools have
different search strategies, and the market is turbulent, characterized by search friction
and large movements of teachers to better, worse, or comparable schools. The market
is not as stable and orderly as it may first appear. Simulations show that simple policies
to direct teacher transfers are at best inefficient.
Jel codes: I24; J48; J62
Keywords: Matching; Teacher transfers; Ability sorting
1 Introduction
While teacher mobility and its impact on education production continues to be debated
and actively researched, two important features of the teacher labor market in the United
States emerge from the literature and the data: a) the teacher labor market is starkly seg-
mented, with inexperienced teachers isolated in poor, underachieving schools, and b) a
relatively stable job-queuing process seems to exist.
Simple summary statistics of teacher characteristics in most administrative data sets
reveal that highly-qualified and experienced teachers are concentrated in schools that
have high academic performance and low proportions of students of traditionally disad-
vantaged groups. Poor, inner-city schools tend to be staffed by teachers with the least
amount of experience. The literature has shown that clear stratification of teachers exists
along dimensions of undergraduate institution selectivity, experience, subject matter, and
certification status (Darling-Hammond 2001, Boyd et al. (2002), and Table 1 in this study).
In addition, there is almost no wage differential across schools (at least within a
state). Because schools do not compete on wages, teacher assignments are differenti-
ated by non-monetary characteristics. Transfer rules (both explicit and implicit), which
are negotiated between teachers and districts, tend to favor teachers with seniority. No
wage differences across jobs should, all else equal, decrease the search rate of teachers.
Seniority-based transfer rules should lead to a positive relationship between experience
and search (and transfer) rate. More experienced teachers should move to schools with
better non-monetary characteristics.
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Table 1 Summary statistics: administrative data
Stayers Transfers New  (Std. Err.)
Demographics
Minority 0.135 0.141 0.119 0.006 (0.011)
Female 0.911 0.888 0.889 -0.023∗∗ (0.010)
MA degree 0.281 0.273 0.214 -0.008 (0.014)
Certified 0.104 0.087 0.007 -0.017∗ (0.009)
Experience
Low (1 - 3 years) 0.237 0.293 0.056∗∗∗ (0.014)
Mid (4 - 10 years) 0.390 0.443 0.053∗∗∗ (0.015)
High (10 + years) 0.373 0.264 -0.109∗∗∗ (0.015)
Year (t-1)
Bad school 0.130 0.212 0.082∗∗∗ (0.011)
Good school 0.870 0.788
School minority % 0.420 0.488 0.068∗∗∗ (0.009)
School poverty % 0.502 0.543 0.041∗∗∗ (0.007)
School female % 0.488 0.487 -0.001 (0.001)
Year (t)
Bad school 0.130 0.149 0.170 0.019∗ (0.011)
Good school 0.870 0.851 0.830
School minority % 0.391 0.412 0.452 0.022∗∗ (0.009)
School poverty % 0.493 0.485 0.497 -0.008 (0.007)
School female % 0.468 0.468 0.468 -0.001 (0.001)
Observations 10260 1136 2011
NCERDC data from 2005/06 and 2006/07. School poverty % is the percentage of student population that receives free or
reduced price lunch. ‘Bad’ schools are low-performing, and ‘good’ schools are high-performing schools. See end-note 16 for
details.  is the difference in means between the Transfers and the Stayers. Difference in means is statistically significant
from zero at ∗10% level, ∗∗5% level, and ∗∗∗1% level, respectively.
The picture that emerges is one of a classic job queueing mechanism, where teachers
who initially match with an undesirable school wait until seniority rules allow them to
move up the job quality ladder tomatch with better schools. Placing teachers based largely
on seniority will most likely lead to sorting that benefits teachers, and not necessarily
students1. Since teachers improve with experience, a queueing mechanism concentrates
inexperienced (and as-of-yet less productive) teachers into schools populated with disad-
vantaged students. As these teachers become more productive, they will then be matched
with students at better schools. Not only can this further widen the academic gap between
the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots,’ the fact that the higher-achieving students reap the bene-
fits (of teacher experience) built on teachers learning from their mistakes while teaching
disadvantaged students is troubling. This understanding of the teacher labor market has
led policy makers, practitioners, and administrators to advocate to eliminate or at least
minimize such teacher transfers through scholarly work, position papers, lawsuits, or
policy changes2.
In this study, I show that our understanding of the teacher labor market may be
incomplete, leading to incorrect policy recommendations designed to curtail the loss of
experienced teachers from under-performing schools. I analyze the teacher labor mar-
ket where a teacher decides to search for a new school, and a school looks for a teacher
to fill a vacancy, using the North Carolina public education administrative data set and
the Working Conditions Survey (WCS). In the theory model, a teacher decides to search
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in a particular school market, and a school searches in a particular teacher market. The
teacher searches in a school market based on a) her utility at the new school conditional
on matching and b) her probability of finding a match in the market. The school searches
in a teacher market based on a) its utility of matching with that teacher (type) and b)
its probability of finding a teacher in that market. Any seniority-based hiring prefer-
ences should be partially reflected in how strongly schools search for highly experienced
teachers.
I then estimate the structural matching model to find the following3:
a) Teachers who are mid-career, with 4 - 10 years of experience, face the lowest cost
of entry to engage in search. Although it is apparent from the data that more mid-career
teachers successfully transfer to a different school, the WCS reveals that their rate of
entry into the transfer market is no higher than teachers with less than 4 years of experi-
ence. The structural model is required to separate the likelihood of entering the transfer
market, the cost of entering the transfer market, the probability of successfully matching
with a new school, and the utility gain from the match. Separating the search process in
this way reveals that mid experience teachers face the lowest entry cost into the transfer
market. However, this low barrier to entry results in too much competition, somewhat
dampening the attractiveness of the search market. In addition, teachers with better pre-
service qualifications (such as advanced degrees or certification) are more likely to be
looking to transfer. Again, this is not obvious from the data, as teachers who transfer and
those that do not move (whether voluntarily or involuntarily) look very similar in terms
of pre-service qualifications.
b) When teachers decide to search, their search strategies differ depending on the
teachers’ status. Teachers from low-achieving schools across all experience levels behave
similarly, searching for a good school about 88% of the time. Teachers from high-achieving
schools have differing search strategies, depending on their level of experience.While mid
and high level experience teachers focus search on high-achieving schools, teachers with
low experience spend about 36% of the time searching for a match with a low achieving
school. I speculate that this may be due to involuntary separation of these non-tenured
teachers from their original school.
c) Different types of schools have different strategies to recruit teachers. A low achieving
school will search 80% of the time for teachers who have at least 4 years of education,
regardless of whether they originate from high or low-achieving schools. On the other
hand, high-achieving schools will focus 75% of their search on teachers with at least 4
years of experience from high-achieving schools. These search strategies reveal that new
teachers are acceptable substitutes for teachers with only a few years of experience. Low-
achieving schools in particular are willing to accept the risks of attempting to match with
a more experienced teacher even if it means that they will, very often, fail and be forced
to ‘settle’ for a new teacher.
d) The observed changes in teacher quality distribution due to transfers under-
state the true extent of labor market volatility and search friction. Conditional on
searching for a new position, even a teacher with the best qualifications (high expe-
rience and originating from a good school) succeeds in finding a match with a high-
achieving school only 64% of the time. Similarly, a high-achieving school manages to
match with a highly experienced teacher from a high-achieving school only 33% of
the time.
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Based on a simplistic, incomplete picture of teacher transfers where themarket operates
through a rigidly stable queuing process, introducing simple changes to seniority rules
could lead to a more efficient (and/or more equitable) allocation of teachers, leading to
improvements in poor schools that lose these experienced teachers4.
Policy simulations using the parameter estimates from the structural model to inves-
tigate the general equilibrium impact of policies to deter the transfer of experienced
teachers yields the following:
a) Decreasing vacancies in desirable schools by 15% leads to movement of low and
high experienced teachers to less desirable schools. However, mid experienced teachers
actually move away from these schools. Entry of teachers into the transfer markets is
broadly suppressed, but the overall impact on improving teacher quality at poor schools
is minimal, as the largest change in the distribution of teachers is a reduction in the num-
ber of newly minted teachers and an increase in the number of low experience teacher.
As schools are shown below to value low experience and no experience teachers about
equally, low achieving schools do not benefit much from the policy.
b) Increasing the desirability of low achieving schools to mid-career teachers by 20%
leads to positive effects, with more teachers of all experience levels ending up at these
schools. Teachers already at these schools refrain from engaging in search, and more
teachers at better performing schools enter the transfer market to look for openings in
these newly improved schools. However, the overall impacts are fairly modest, with the
number ofmid experience teachers increasing by about 7%. Given the large costs of imple-
mentation to impact a relatively small number of schools, this policy seems unlikely to be
implemented.
The next subsection describes the teacher transfer market in detail and justifies the
need for a structural matching model for this analysis. Section 2 describes the two data
sets used in the estimation. Section 3 describes the econometric model in detail, and the
estimation strategy is presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents and discusses the results
which are used in the policy simulations in Section 6. Conclusions follow in Section 7.
1.1 Teacher Transfers and the Matching Market
Teachers are mobile. As I show in the data section, even teachers with high levels of expe-
rience (and long tenures at a school) will move. Since a principal will, on average, lose 10 to
20% of her workforce each year, she must be searching annually for replacements. In other
labor markets, wage differentials across jobs would play a prominent role in how employ-
ers and employees search for each other, with wages moving up or down in response to
changes in labor demand and supply to clear the market.
In the education labor market, however, wages are flat across schools (with the
exception of small district-specific differences)5 and change only with experience level,
certification, and advanced degrees. That is, the price of labor is exogenous. These indi-
vidual pay increases are usually based on characteristics inherent to the teacher and are
portable6. Therefore, a principal cannot recruit on wage but must seek to attract teachers
based on the characteristics of her school7. In addition, because teacher salary is not paid
by the principal but at the district level, teachers are cost-neutral to the principal. She will
recruit a teacher based on her characteristics and not the wage that will have to be paid.
In addition, restrictive hiring rules may tie a principal’s hands in searching for teach-
ers to fill vacancies. Seniority-based hiring is thought to impact a school negatively by
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some principals as well as many education experts, yet many times they are powerless to
prevent such transfers (Ballou 1999). Teachers’ contracts are perceived to inhibit the prin-
cipals’ ability to effectively select their labor force. At the same time, involuntary transfers
that are initiated by the principal, usually to jettison ineffective teachers, appear to be only
a minor component of the teacher labor market (Nelson 2006). Summary statistics from
administrative data sets (See Table 1 in this study, for example) show that when teach-
ers transfer, in general, they move to ‘better’ schools, and that these teachers tend to be
at mid-career or later, with at least 4 years of experience. The literature has shown that
disadvantaged schools have difficulty recruiting teachers and are less selective in hiring,
while advantaged schools tend to have a surplus of applicants, allowing them to be more
selective. (Darling-Hammond 2001 and Boyd et al. 2002).
Accountability legislation may also influence a principal’s recruiting decision by intro-
ducing market pressures in terms of monetary rewards or sanctions8. Some districts
in North Carolina have tried to actively prevent the transfer of teachers into ‘desirable’
schools of high academic achievement and restrict transferring principals from ‘poaching’
too many teachers from their origin schools (Helms 2005).
In North Carolina, teachers who wish to transfer to a different school submit their
names to a central clearing house, but the process by which teachers and schools actu-
ally match are different for each individual case. While there may be some matching that
occurs according to a mechanical rule-set, at least in the majority of cases, it appears that
teachers and principals do actively search for each other. Principals will strategically time
posting of open positions or reach out to certain teachers to impact recruiting outcomes.
Some administrators cultivate a draconian image or send out negative observable signals
to discourage potential bad matches (Ballou 1999). Conversations with education policy
practitioners in North Carolina reveal that ambitious principals in North Carolina aggres-
sively search through transfer applicant lists to look for the most desirable candidates.
Indeed, the anecdotal evidence points to the existence of a complex and active transfer
market.
All that can be said with certainty is that some teachers and schools search for each
other based on observable characteristics. Other teachers are content to stay at their
school (for the time being, at least). Some teachers and schools succeed in matching, and
these are observed as transfers in the data. Other teachers and schools fail to match, in
which case there is no movement. The process is decentralized, with the state providing
only a platform for both sides of the markets to post their availability9.
If the surface teacher labor market appears as an orderly job queuing process, while
there is an active, turbulent job search market underneath, our understanding of the
teacher labor market would be incomplete. If the model of teacher transfer used to make
policy recommendations does not adequately capture the churning of the labor market,
instituting simple policies to stop or slow the perceived movement of teachers up the job
quality ladder may not accomplish the goal of keeping experienced teachers where they
are most needed.
With the lack of a price mechanism to sort teachers, the complexity of the transfer
process, and no detailed survey data to track teacher and school search behavior, a struc-
tural matching market framework is the most natural and tractable model for the teacher
transfer decision as described above. Some previous studies have looked at the transfer
decision in the context of a matching model. Boyd et al. (2013) showed that teachers are
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particularly sensitive to the distance between the school and their place of birth or high
school attended. In another study where the authors had detailed information about all
transfer applicants, Boyd et al. (2011) determined that teachers that are most likely to
apply for a transfer look different from those who are most likely to find a match.
Two common challenges in estimating a matching model are the difficulties in defining
a) who is searching and b) the choice-set over which she searches (such that estimation is
tractable). Information to identify teachers (and schools) that are searching can be diffi-
cult to obtain10. In the absence of this information, the entire sample is usually assumed
to be searching. For this study, I am able to extract aggregate statistics on searching teach-
ers at the school-level from a separate survey of teachers, which will be used to augment
the individual matching data from the North Carolina administrative dataset.
Defining the choice-set to allow empirical estimation usually requires multi-
dimensional logit or probits (if the sample size is small enough), simulated maximum
likelihood estimation, or alternative frameworks such as the use of maximum score esti-
mators (MSE)11. I define the choice-set as a limited number ofmarkets that teachers and
schools may search over12. In the model, neither teachers nor schools are bound by geog-
raphy in searching for each other. Teachers observe all openings in the state, and schools
observe all applicants in North Carolina. Teachers choose to search for a certain type of
school (‘good’ or ‘bad’, as defined below in the Data section). Schools choose to search for
a certain type of teacher (defined by the teacher’s experience and whether she is currently
at a good or bad school). Both teachers and schools evaluate the utility gain if they search
in a particular market and succeed inmatching. The probability of success depends on the
number of teachers of her type searching for her preferred school type and the number
of schools of her preferred type searching for teachers of her type. Based on this calcu-
lation, teachers decide whether to search for a new position, which in turn, affects the
probability of all other teachers and schools in finding a match13.
2 Data
I use an administrative data set for the North Carolina public school system from the
2005/06 and 2006/07 academic years. The data set contains information on all public
schools, students, and teachers in North Carolina. The data is collected annually, and
the capability exists to link students and teachers across years. What emerges is a rela-
tively complete longitudinal picture of the entire North Carolina public school system.
This allows me to track the movement of teachers into the labor market and between
schools from year to year. Teachers located in a particular school in the 2005/06 aca-
demic year and located in a different school in the 2006/07 academic year are identified
as transferring teachers.
In addition, I make use of the North Carolina Working Conditions Survey. This bien-
nially administered anonymous survey queries all public school teachers and principals
about their perception of the school environment. I use the 2006 survey, which was
administered in April of that year. The timing of the survey is important for this study,
as April will be just before a teacher officially commits to searching for a new position.
The survey captures the teacher’s labor market plans in the immediate future, asking
whether she plans to continue teaching at the current school, seek better opportunities
elsewhere (within or outside the current education district), or leave the profession14. The
response rate for the 2006 WCS was approximately 60%. Aggregate statistics across the
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administrative data and the WCS data for gender, minority status, and experience were
qualitatively similar.
I focus on elementary school teachers in this study, as middle and high school teachers
may have different career trajectories. I explicitly exclude teachers who leave the profes-
sion from both data sets. From the WCS, this is accomplished by dropping all teachers
who answer that they will leave the profession. For the administrative data set, I stack the
2006/07, 2007/08, and 2008/09 data sets to isolate teachers who appear in the 2005/06
data set yet disappear from subsequent year data sets.
Of note for these two data sets is that they cannot be directly linked. Although teachers
are identified up to the school level in the WCS, the individual observations cannot be
linked to the administrative data set. Therefore, while it is possible to identify teachers
who are successful in transferring to a new school (and therefore, were searching for a
new position), those who remain at the same school can either be: 1) teachers who chose
not to search or 2) teachers who searched but failed to match. The estimation will have to
take this into account.
Some summary statistics from the administrative data set and theWCS are presented in
Tables 1 and 215. The first column of Table 1, labeled ‘Stayer’ contains summary statistics
for teachers who remain at their current school across the two years of the data. The sec-
ond column, labeled ‘Transfers’ summarizes characteristics of teachers who successfully
move to a new school. The third column, labeled ‘New,’ contains information on teachers
newly hired in the second year of the data. The final column, labeled ‘,’ calculates the
difference in means between Transfers and Stayers.
I divide schools into two categories: low-performing and high-performing. The cate-
gories are based on the state’s own system of evaluating schools based on its accountability
system. Low-performing schools are those with less than 60% of their students reading
and doing arithmetic at their grade levels. High-performing schools are those with more
than 60% of their students performing at grade level16. In categorizing the schools, I use
the school categorization from 2005/06 data and do not update the school categorization
in year 2006/07 (when teachers show up in their new schools). This is because the infor-
mation available to teachers when they are making the transfer decision is the school’s
status in 2005/06. Therefore, in Table 1, the schools in each category in years t-1 and t are
identical.
Experience level is divided into low (1 to 3 years), mid (4 to 10 years), and high (more
than 10 years) for this study17. Low level of experience represents nontenured teachers
who are still relatively new to the job. Previous studies of teacher productivity have shown
Table 2 Percentage of teacher of type j, ko entering the transfer market: WCS dataset
Experience (j), School Type (ko) Pr. of Mkt. Entry
Low experience, bad School 0.480
Mid experience, bad School 0.444
High experience, bad School 0.330
Low experience, good School 0.334
Mid experience, good School 0.328
High experience, good School 0.224
Working Conditions Survey (WCS) data from 2006. The probability that a teacher of type j, ko decides to search for a new
position, where j is the level of experience, and ko is the type of school where the teacher is currently employed. ‘Bad’
schools are low-performing, and ‘good’ schools are high-performing schools. ‘Low’ experience is 1-3 years, ‘Mid’ experience
if 4-10 years, and ‘High’ experience is 10+ years. See end-note 16 for details.
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that these teachers are, on average, lower performing compared to teachers with more
experience, yet they make gains each year (Rivkin et al. 2005). Because of their proba-
tionary status, it may be easier to remove these teachers from the school if they severely
under-perform. They also tend to leave the teaching profession at higher rates compared
to teachers with more experience. As it can be seen from the data, they are not highly
mobile (at least in their ability to transfer), most likely due to the limited options available
to them. Mid levels of experience are tenured teachers who are continuing to see pro-
ductivity gains, but at smaller and decreasing increments. These teachers tend to be the
most mobile, and many will move to a more desirable school. High levels of experience
are tenured teachers who are on the flat or even declining portions of the productivity
curve. Although these teachers are less mobile compared to mid-level experienced teach-
ers, they can be induced to search, as one quarter of all transfers are teachers from this
category.
The general impression from Table 1 is that there is a slow, orderly process by which
teachers move up the school quality ladder. New teachers with no experience enter the
profession at a ‘bad’ school (at a higher proportion compared to incumbent teachers, at
0.17). As they gain experience, these teachers transfer to a ‘good’ school such that the pro-
portion changes to 0.149. Eventually, the proportion of teachers in bad schools converges
to 0.13. In Table 2, however, the high proportion of teachers who are searching for a new
position annually hints at the possibility that the labor market is not as stable and orderly
as Table 1 may imply. If roughly 40% of teachers are searching with less than half result-
ing in successful matches, there may be significant labor market friction18. Table 2 also
reveals that low and mid experience teachers enter the transfer markets at almost iden-
tical rates, at about 45% and 33% for teachers from ‘bad’ and ‘good’ schools, respectively.
High experience teachers are least likely to engage in search.
3 Model
3.1 Teachers
Teachers are identified by a) group characteristics (j ∈ J) and b) origin school character-
istics (ko ∈ K). The probability of a j-type teacher from a ko-type school matching with a
k-type school is Pkj,ko . The deterministic portion of utility conditional onmatching is given
by μkj,ko for a j-type teacher from a ko-type school transferring to a k-type school. The




. Note that the ν term is teacher-
type specific, while the  term is match-specific. I assume that ν and  are independently
distributed and known to the teacher (but not to the econometrician).
The teacher makes two (sequential) decisions:
1. Whether to enter the transfer market or to forgo search altogether.
2. Conditional on deciding to enter, selecting which k-type school market to search in.
Deciding to search incurs an entry cost into the transfer market Kj,ko , and deciding to
move conditional on a match incurs a moving cost Ckj,ko .
I set up the model in reverse. Conditional on deciding to search, a j-type teacher from a
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Note that conditional on failing to match, the teacher merely takes the utility of staying
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Assuming that the individual match errors are distributed as i.i.d. extreme value Type
I, I can write the probability of a j-type teacher from a ko-type school looking to transfer
to a k-type school (assuming I could observe which type of school the teacher looks to
match with) as a multinomial logit19:

























Schools match with teachers in much the same manner, with one difference: if a school
searches for a j, ko-type teacher and does not match, the outside option (which is guar-
anteed) is with a newly minted teacher. I assume that a school does not explicitly search
for a new teacher20. I assume that search cost is identical across all schools looking for all
teacher types21. Specifying the utility of matching with a teacher with zero experience as




















The probability of a k-type school getting a j, ko-type teacher is22:
























Since I only observe successful matches, I next define a matching function to derive
Pkj,ko .
3.3 Matching
For simplicity, I assume a Cobb-Douglas matching function where the number of matches
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where Tj,ko is the number of j-type teachers from ko schools who search for new positions,
and Ok is the number of teacher positions open from k-type schools. A is a normalizing

















It is worth noting that in this framework, the probability of matching with a newly
minted teacher from the school side, P0k , is unidentified even if searching in this market
were allowed. In the matching framework, both the number of searching teachers and
schools are necessary to derive the matching probabilities. However, T0, the number of
newly minted teachers in the market is unidentified since those new teachers who failed
to match are never observed.
3.4 Teacher decision to enter the transfer market
I assume that schools must fill empty positions. Teachers do have an option to not enter
the transfer market23. I define the teacher’s value of entering the transfer market (VT)
























= 0∀k ∈ K to the teacher as well. The entry cost
contains the error term ν, which is distributed i.i.d. normal:
Kj,ko = zj,ko + νj,ko
The j-type teacher from ko-type school searches when VTj,ko > VNj,ko , so the number























− μkoj,ko − zj,ko
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Note that ν is teacher-type specific and not match specific. Because the WCS and
the administrative data cannot be linked at the teacher level, it is impossible to discern
whether some teachers are immobile by choice or by a failed search. To deal with this con-
straint of the data, I assume that the initial decision to enter the market is independent of
the match specific error () draws that the teacher observes when she chooses to search in
particular school markets. The ν term is then interpreted as a shock that impacts only the
entry cost for the teacher. For example, health, family, or financial reasons may change a
teacher’s willingness to uproot and move, which is unchanging across all school markets
she can potentially search in.
3.5 Teacher Decision to Quit
I do not explicitly model a teacher quit decision in the model. Labeling the current school
year as t and the next school year as t+1, the search decision is made between t and t+1.
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I assume that a teacher who has decided to leave the profession due to her unsatisfactory
search outcome serves out her contract in year t+1 and exits in year t+2. More generally,
I do not include the quit decision in the choice set for teachers because to exit the pro-
fession is a longer-term, career changing/ending decision that is dynamic in nature and
ill-suited to a one-shot game model24. This assumption is tacitly confirmed by the fact
that the fraction of teachers who identify themselves as planning on leaving the teaching
profession in the WCS (≈ 8.7% of the sample) is close to the actual fraction of teachers
who are lost from the data between years t and t + 1 (≈ 9.7% of the sample).
3.6 School decision to enter the transfer market
While it is technically possible to write out the school’s decision to search using the frame-
work specified for the teacher search decision specified above, I choose to abstract away
from the school decision. It seems that schools do not have much of a decision to make
whether to search or not. If a class does not have a teacher assigned to it, the school must
fill this position. While it may be feasible to not hire a teacher and distribute students
into the remaining classes, it seems unclear what, if any, utility or education production
function this decision would maximize. Conditional on the salary budget and salary for
individual teachers being exogenous to the principal, I assume the principal would never
decide not to search if a need exists25.
4 Estimation
The data available dictate the econometric model. Teachers can be identified up to the
school-level, and minimal demographic characteristics are available in the WCS. In par-
ticular, using theWCS, I can discern what fraction of teachers of a certain type from each
school decides to search for a new teaching position. However, I cannot link the teacher
from the WCS to the NC administrative data. This means that I cannot directly link
the entry-into-the-transfer-market decision to the search-in-a-particular-market deci-
sion individually. I divide teachers by the three experience levels defined in the data
section as well as the origin school type. This identifies six unique types of teachers and
two types of schools26. Origin school type shouldmatter to teachers, because the assump-
tion is that transferring teachers are referencing the type of school they came from, to
judge whether they will be happier moving to a particular type of school. Origin school
should also matter to the searching school as well, as an immediately observable signal of
teacher quality. Significant parameter estimates on the origin type variable in the school’s
utility function seem to indicate that principals do use this information in selecting what
markets to search in27.
The general strategy then is to break down the decision process into two sequential
search decisions. In the first, using theWCS data, I extract the probability of entry into the
transfer market by teacher type, which will be parametrized by the individual expected
utilities of matching with the different types of schools (as well as failing to match and
remaining in the current school). This will ‘predict’ the number of teachers who decide to
search, which can be plugged into the probability of matching, which can then be plugged
into the probability of searching in a particular market, conditional on deciding to search.
Finally, these probabilities can be plugged back into the entry decision to generate the
predicted number of searchers again.
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If a teacher of type j from school type ko decides to enter the transfer market, the out-
come is described in the WCS data as Sj,ko = 1. If the teacher decides to forgo search,
Sj,ko = 0. Again, it is worth noting that from the teacher side, the sample excludes new
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where (·) is the standard normal distribution function.
If a teacher of type j from school ko transfers to a new school, the outcome is described
in the administrative data as a match, Mj,ko = k. If the teacher remains at her current

























































This first line of the likelihood function contributes the probability of observing a j, ko
type teacher who searches and matches with a type k school. The second line contributes
the probability of observing a teacher of a certain type who does not match, which could
arise because she failed to match or chose not to search. The third line contributes the
probability of a school of a certain typematching with a certain type of teacher. The fourth
line contributes the probability of a school failing to find amatch and hiring a new teacher.
The summation over the types of teachers (j, ko) in the third and fourth lines emphasizes
the exclusion of new teachers.
Teacher side γ kj,ko and school side γ
j,ko
k choice probabilities are specified as multinomial











I fix α = 0.5 to allow for symmetric friction from both the teacher and school side29.
During the first iteration, from the WCS data, I extract the number of searching teach-
ers and the probability of entering the transfer market by teacher type (Tj,ko and(Sj,ko =
1), respectively). From the administrative data set, I extract the number of vacancies by
school type (Ok). The part of the likelihood for schools that do not match are defined as
schools that hire new teachers. Therefore, Ok is defined as the sum of transfers and new
hires. Using these values, I maximize the log likelihood of the matching model (Lm) while
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solving for the fixed point (at the teacher and school matching probabilities (Pkj,ko and
Pj,k
o
k , respectively)). With these values in hand, I calculate the probabilities and expected
utility values needed to maximize the log likelihood of the entry decision (Ls) to generate











is iterated until convergence, defined below.
At each iteration t, a set of parameters, predicted probabilities, and number of searching
teachers are estimated. The system converges when:






k , T̂j,ko , ̂(Sj,ko = 1)
}
t−1
∥∥∥∥< η∀ j ∈ J , k ∈ K , ko ∈ K ,
where η → 0.
5 Results
The parameter estimates are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 contains the parameters
for the cost function in the teacher’s initial decision on whether to enter the teacher trans-
fermarket. Compared to the base-line case of a teacher with high experience, no advanced
degree, and no certification, a teacher is more likely to enter the market if she is less
experienced, has an advanced degree, or is certificated, all else equal. This provides con-
firmation of results found in other studies that show that teachers with high pre-service
qualification tend to apply for transfers at a higher rate. Interestingly, currently being at a
bad school is not a significant predictor of search.
Mid level experience (4 to 10 years in the teaching profession) is the strongest predic-
tor of search. This is most likely due to the combination of the teacher having earned
tenure (thus being more confident about their career prospects compared to low experi-
ence teachers) yet young enough to be mobile compared to teachers with more years of
service.
Table 4 shows the utility parameters of teachers matching with a particular school type
and of schools matching with a particular teacher type. The top-third of Table 4 con-
tains parameters for teacher utility. The parameter on low experience for matching with
a bad school type is 0.3224. That is, compared to the base case of a teacher with high
experience originating from a good school, a low experience teacher is happier matching
with a bad school. The negative parameter on mid experience can be interpreted as the
significant disutility felt by a mid experience teacher when matching with a bad school,
Table 3 Teacher decision to enter transfer market
Entry cost parameters (Std. err.)
White 0.1180 (0.0217)
Low exp. -0.1608 (0.0223)
Mid exp. -0.6661 (0.0183)
MA or above -0.1473 (0.0173)
Certified -0.1031 (0.0257)
Bad schl. -0.0209 (0.0226)
Constant 1.4472 (0.0237)
Dependent variable is whether the surveyed teacher answered that she would be seeking to move to a new school in the










Table 4 Teacher-school match
Teacher side parameters (Std. err.)
School types
Bad Good
Low exp. 0.3224 (0.0114) 0.2764 (0.0083)
Mid exp. -0.7503 (0.0275) 0.0505 (0.0065)
ko = bad 1.4381 (0.1279) 0.7085 (0.0662)
Constant -0.4545 (0.0720) 1.3501 (0.0013)
School side parameters (Std. err.)
Teacher types (exp. level/origin schl. type)
Low/bad Mid/bad High/bad Low/good Mid/good High/good
Bad schl. 0.8401 (0.0127) 1.1031 (0.0023) 1.4815 (0.0118) -1.3037 (0.0327) -0.8071 (0.0082) -1.4123 (0.0291)




Teacher and school utility parameters and matching function estimates. α, the matching elasticity from the teacher side, is fixed at 0.5.
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compared to a highly experienced teacher. This may be due to the fact that a mid-career
teacher regards a transfer as a chance to move into a more desirable school, while a highly
experienced teachermovingmay be driven by life-style concerns unrelated to school qual-
ity. The parameter on originating from a bad school is 1.4381. That is, a teacher from a
bad school will be significantly happier to match with a bad school compared to a teacher
from a good school.
On the school side (the middle of Table 4), a bad school does not mind matching with
a teacher originally from a bad school (0.8401 for low expereince, 1.1031 for mid experi-
ence, and 1.4815 for high experience). On the other hand, good schools are significantly
happier to match with teachers who originate from good schools. This can be seen by not-
ing that the utility of a good school matching with a low experience teacher from a good
school (0.7554) is much higher than the utility of a good school matching with a high
experience teacher from a bad school (-0.6287). This shows that good and bad schools
have different priorities in recruiting teachers, with bad schools favoring experience and
good schools choosing based on where the teacher came from. This will be reflected in
the match and search probabilities.
The bottom-third of Table 4 shows the matching parameters. As stated previously, α is
fixed in the estimation at 0.5. This has the effect of assuming that teachers and schools
contribute equally to the matching process. The number of matches between teachers











γ kj,koTj,ko · γ j,k
o
k Ok
This is admittedly a strong assumption. Some teachers (or principals) may be more or
less active or effective in searching for a match. A more active teacher may skew α higher,
and a more active principal may lead to a lower α. The probability normalizing constantA
was estimated as an exponential function to prevent generating a negative probability30.









The first two columns present the estimated probability of a j, ko-type teacher searching
for a k-type school. The last two columns show, conditional on searching for a k-type
school, the estimated probability of the j, ko-type teacher matching with the desired
school type. For example, 11.18% of teachers with low experience who are currently at
bad schools will seek a match with another bad school, while 88.82% of these teachers will
seek a match with a good school. Of these teachers who search for a bad school, 53.61%
will successfully match. Of these teachers that search for a good school, only 34.73% will
be able to move next year.
Results show that the probability of matching with a bad school is always greater than
the probability of matching with a good school for teachers originating from bad schools.
This is not very surprising. It is attributable to higher rates of transfer at bad schools,
leading to more vacancies, and fewer teachers of all types searching for positions at bad
schools, leading to less competition for these positions. Table 4 also shows that the prob-
ability of finding a match increases with experience level and with originating from a
good school. For matching with a good school, originating from a good school dominates
experience level. To match with a bad school, higher experience dominates school origin.
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These probabilities confirm the utility parameter results observed in Table 4, that good
and bad schools have different priorities in recruiting teachers.
These match probabilities, along with the utility of matching, drive the search decision
of teachers. Most teachers favor searching for a match with a good school. The lack of
a flexible wage in the teacher labor market results in bad schools having a difficult time
competing with good schools for these teachers. This holds even for teachers with low lev-
els of experience because if a teacher does not succeed in finding a match, she can always
take her outside option of remaining at her current school. This emboldens low experi-
ence teachers to search at a high rate. Interestingly, low-experienced teachers from good
schools have a higher probability of searching for a bad school to match with, compared
to all other groups (36% compared to about 12%). This could indicate these teachers who
are already in good schools are looking to move for non-occupation-related reasons, or
these could be non-tenured teachers who are pushed out of their initial placement after
being found to be unsatisfactory31.
Table 4 also reconciles why currently being at a bad school does not induce stronger
search, as observed in Table 3, yet summary statistics from Table 1 suggests teachers
queue for a chance at moving to better schools. While teachers with low and high levels of
experience are relatively immobile, mid experience teachers engage in search by focusing
almost entirely on matching with good schools. Low experience teachers are immobile
because they are more likely to fail to match with their desired school. High experience
teachers do not move because they are less likely to be in the transfer market to start.
Therefore, while the levels of low and high experienced teachers tend to stay relatively
constant across good and bad schools, mid-level experience teachers move aggressively
into good schools (or fail to match and stay at the current schools), thus generating the
observed aggregate trends.
The probabilities in Table 4 also highlight the turbulence and friction in the teacher
labor market that is hidden in the summary statistics. While, as noted above, there are
usually large differences in probability of matching to a good school compared to a bad
school, even at its largest, the disparity is under 30 percentage points. Low experience
teachers from bad schools, who by far are the least likely to succeed in matching with a
good school, still have a 35% chance. High experience teachers from good schools, who
have the highest probability of matching with bad or good schools, have a 65% and a
64% chance, respectively, meaning even these teachers are not assured of successfully
matching with their desired choice all the time. Combined with search probability values,
these numbers indicate that there is a lot of movement from good schools to bad schools,
from bad to good, from bad to bad, from good to good, and stationary teachers who
want to move but fail to find a suitable match. The gradual convergence seen in the data
summaries is the result of the combination of all of these movements (as well as teachers
who are not searching).












of schools. The top
two rows present the estimated probability of a k-type school searching for a j, ko-type
teacher. The bottom two rows show the estimated probability of the k-type school suc-
cessfully matching with the desired j, ko-type teacher, conditional on searching for her
type. For example, only 3.31% of bad schools will search for a teacher with low experi-
ence who is currently at a bad school. Meanwhile, 35.99% of these schools will search for
a teacher who is already at a good school with a mid-level of experience.
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Table 5 Search/Match probabilities (teacher side): γ kj,ko and Pkj,ko








Bad schl. Good schl. Bad schl. Good schl.
Low exp., bad schl. 0.1118 0.8882 0.5361 0.3473
Mid exp., bad schl. 0.1239 0.8761 0.7013 0.4683
High exp., bad schl. 0.1133 0.8867 0.7946 0.4915
Low exp., good schl. 0.3664 0.6636 0.3875 0.6062
Mid exp., good schl. 0.1892 0.8108 0.5520 0.6153
High exp., good schl. 0.0669 0.9331 0.6503 0.6425




, and conditional on searching for a k-type





Bad schools have the highest probabilities of matching with teachers with low levels of
experience (39.91% with teachers from bad schools and 55.21% with teachers from good
schools). They also stand a good chance of matching with teachers from good schools,
especially those with low levels of experience. This is consistent with the high search
rate of these teachers for bad schools, as was seen in Table 4. In addition, because teach-
ers from good schools outnumber those from bad schools by more than 6 to 1, even a
small fraction of teachers from good schools seeking to move to a bad school will make
matching relatively easy from the school-side. Good schools can more easily match with
teachers from bad schools, but they spend almost no time searching in these markets.
Summing across all experience levels, good schools spend only 11.69% of their search time
for teachers from bad schools. Yet even if good schools search in the low experience, bad
school origin market, their chance of matching stands at 62%. Again, this is indicative of
the high degree of search friction in the teacher transfer labor market. These probabilities
affect the schools’ search decisions. Bad schools search mostly for mid-level and highly
experienced teachers originating from both bad and good schools (77.03% of their search
time). Good schools focus mostly on mid-level and highly experienced teachers from
good schools (75.06% of their search time). Again, this confirms the utility parameters on
the school side from Table 4.
Themotivation for bad schools in focusing their search on teachers withmid experience
from good schools is more complex. From Table 6, we see that the probability of a bad
school matching with teachers from good schools is surprisingly high, at almost 40% for
mid-experience teachers. This is because there are so many teachers from good schools











Low, bad Mid, bad High, bad Low, good Mid, good High, good
Bad schl. 0.0331 0.0853 0.1191 0.1967 0.3599 0.2060







Low, bad Mid, bad High, bad Low, good Mid, good High, good
Bad schl. 0.3991 0.3050 0.2692 0.5521 0.3876 0.3290
Good schl. 0.6161 0.4568 0.4353 0.3529 0.3477 0.3329






, and conditional on searching for a
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in the transfer market. As over 85% of schools in North Carolina are designated as good
schools, even a small fraction of these teachers choosing to search for a match with bad
schools greatly increase these schools’ likelihoods of finding their desired matches.
In addition, the search patterns of schools reveals the true value of the outside option,
new teachers. Schools are weighing two options. P is the probability of matching, and
μ(exp.) is the school’s utility of matching with a teacher with low, high, or no experience.
(lowP) · μ(high exp.) − μ(no exp.)
and
(highP) · μ(low exp.) − μ(no exp.)
The top equation is the difference in expected utility from searching for a highly experi-
enced teacher and the outside option (new teacher). The bottom equation is the difference
in expected utility of matching with a low experience teacher and the outside option. By
the observed search behavior of schools, it is clear that both good and bad schools find
the top value to be greater than the bottom. This can be true due to a combination of
three reasons: a) small difference in P, b) large difference between μ for high and low
experienced teachers, and c) a high μ value for new teachers. Since Table 5 shows that the
probability difference is relatively large, and from the literature it is known that the pro-
ductivity difference between high and low experienced teachers is rather small, it must
be that μ(no exp.) is high enough to make new teachers a viable substitute for low expe-
rienced teachers32. The relatively high likelihood of matching with experienced teachers
and the ready substitute in the form of new teachers induces bad schools to be ambitious
in courting experienced teachers from good schools.
6 Policy Simulations
In the previous section, I showed the teacher transfer market, while looking placid and
orderly on the surface, is actually very turbulent and active. Therefore, attempting to inter-
vene to redirect teacher transfers without accounting for the two-sided targeted search
and friction may have unintended consequences.
An example of an actual policy change attempted at the district level (Charlotte-
Mecklenburg, North Carolina) included a complete ban on teachers transferring to
schools that had met district goals for average teacher experience and fraction of teach-
ers holding advanced degrees. The district concurrently offered incentives to encourage
teacher transfers into high poverty schools.
In an attempt to explore the policy implications of trying to increase teacher quality
at disadvantaged schools, I run two simulations that change the number of vacancies
and estimated utility parameter values to generate new counts of searching teachers and
schools and new probabilities of searching and matching.
The first simulation shuts down transfers into a fraction of vacancies in good schools
by decreasing the number of positions potentially available by 15 percent, essentially set-
ting the probability of these schools searching for teachers across all markets to zero.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg is the largest school district in North Carolina, and roughly 1/8
of teaching positions in the sample are located in this district. This simulation approxi-
mates the impact on teachers state-wide of banning transfers into Charlotte-Mecklenburg
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schools that had already met their goals for recruiting teachers with good observable
characteristics. The simulation results are presented in Table 7.
The left-side of the table shows the probability of teachers entering the mar-
ket, the search probabilities, and the match probabilities conditional on entering the
market. The column labeled ‘N’ shows the number of teachers of each experience
level (j) ending up (whether through matching, failing to match, or not search-
ing) in school type (k). The right-side of the table contrasts the simulation results
with the estimated probabilities and equilibrium distribution of teachers from the
base case.
With the reduction in positions available for matching, teacher entry into transfer mar-
ket decreases for every type except those with low experience from good schools. The
decline is especially steep for low and high experience teachers from bad schools, who
are less likely to engage in search by 8.4 and 7.1 percentage points, respectively. This
change is due to the direct effect of teachers who were considering searching in the good
school market pulling back, as well as the indirect effect of a reduction in match probabil-






uniformly shifts toward bad schools. This is especially
pronounced for low experience teachers from good schools, who shift search by 10 per-
centage points. From the school-side, a reduction in the number of vacancies from good
schools means lower competition for highly desirable teachers for good schools that are
still in the market. As such, their strategy of search shifts to searching more heavily for
mid and high experience teachers from good schools. Low experience teachers from good
schools who are in the search market respond to this by shifting search to the bad school
market, where they are most likely to find a match.





all teacher types for bad schools. Match probabilities in good schools, interestingly,
increase slightly or are flat across all teacher types. This change is driven by the shift in
search strategy of low experience teachers from good schools, who make up a sizable
fraction of teachers in the data. Because these teachers shift away from the good school
market, other teachers who decide to search in the good school market benefit from
decreased competition.
Examining the equilibrium distribution of teachers after the policy implementation, we
see that the policy yielded mixed results. The number of teachers in bad schools with low
and high experience rose by 8.1% and 2.9%, respectively, while the number of mid experi-
ence teachers actually fell by 0.7%. The largest changes in movement patterns for teachers
compared to the base case were large numbers of low experience teachers in good schools
switching to bad schools and most teachers becoming less likely to enter the transfer
market. While the broad suppression of search may be what policy makers intended,
examining the distribution of teachers after the simulation, it is far from clear that bad
schools benefit from this policy. As described above, schools reveal themselves to regard
low experience and new teachers about equally. This valuation gives bad schools license
to take chances in recruiting more highly experienced teachers. Bad schools, therefore,
may be indifferent to a policy where the primary impact is changing one set of teachers











Table 7 Policy simulation results with vacancies at good schools reduced by 15%
Simulation results Differences (Simulation results - base case)








N Mkt entry γ kj,ko P
k
j,ko %N
Bad sch Good sch Bad sch Good sch Bad sch Good sch Bad sch Good sch
Low/bad 0.396 0.166 0.834 0.483 0.353 537.7 -0.084 0.055 -0.055 -0.053 0.005 0.081
Mid/bad 0.437 0.181 0.820 0.656 0.486 662.8 -0.007 0.057 -0.057 -0.045 0.017 -0.007
High/bad 0.259 0.140 0.860 0.779 0.512 443.8 -0.071 0.027 -0.027 -0.016 0.021 0.029
Low/good 0.341 0.466 0.534 0.370 0.617 2225.3 0.006 0.100 -0.100 -0.018 0.010 -0.028
Mid/good 0.289 0.207 0.793 0.527 0.610 3840.2 -0.039 0.018 -0.018 -0.025 -0.005 0.001
High/good 0.213 0.070 0.930 0.630 0.636 3686.2 -0.011 0.003 -0.003 -0.020 -0.007 -0.003




’ is the directed search probabilities of a representative teacher of type j, ko toward a school type k, conditional on




’ is the probability of a teacher of type j, ko successfully matching with a school type k, conditional on searching in that market.
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The second simulation explicitly increased the utility that a mid experience teacher
receives from matching with a bad school. The number of ‘utils’ for a mid experience
teacher from a bad school matching with another bad school is approximately 0.23. The
same teacher’s utility in matching with a good school is approximately 2.12. I increase the
parameter for mid experience in the utility of matching with a bad school by .375, which
decreases the utility gap between these two types of schools by about 20%. This simula-
tion approximates the impact of offering incentives to encourage mid-career teachers to
move to schools that had been difficult to staff. While the choice of 20% is somewhat arbi-
trary, policy makers do seem to be aware that small improvements in bad schools will not
induce teachers to locate to (or remain at) these schools. A teacher in North Carolina with
a bachelor’s degree, certification, and 10 years of experience would earn just over $ 40,000
(2006 dollars) in 200633. In addition to bonuses available to teachers state-wide from
year-over-year standardized test score gains, teachers were eligible to receive additional
monetary compensation for signing up to teach in a bad school, a recruitment “sign-
ing” bonus (for the person who recruited the new teacher), an annual retention incentive
for teachers with more experience and advanced degrees, and an additional pilot pay-
for-performance program specifically aimed at schools in Charlotte-Mecklenburg that
underperformed. Altogether, available bonuses in these poor schools may total as much
as $8,50034. Perhaps just as important, the federal No Child Left Behind (NCLB) act and
local initiatives began to push for recruiting better leadership (through pay-incentives)
and even forcibly replacing bad leadership at under-performing schools. Upgrading lead-
ership at these schools should substantially raise the utility of teachers. Teachers cite good
leadership as one of themost important factors that determine whether a school is a desir-
able place to work, and better leadership leads to higher academic performance (Ahn and
Vigdor 2014)35. Results from the policy simulation are presented in Table 8.
When bad schools are made more attractive, market entry patterns change predictably.
Moremid experience teachers from good schools enter the transfer market. Just as impor-
tantly, this suppresses search of mid experience teachers from bad schools by more than
10 percentage points. These large changes in mid experience teachers’ propensity to
search has ripple effects for other types of teachers. The focused attention on bad schools
leads to a reduction in the likelihood of entry into the transfer market of low and high
experienced teachers from bad schools. In contrast, low and high experienced teachers





, mid experience teachers from both bad and good schools
shift heavily toward searching in the bad schools market, by 7.5 and 2.1 percentage points,
respectively. Interestingly, all other types of teachers shift search to bad schools as well,
with the exception of high experience teachers from good schools.
This large increase in search in the bad school market predictably leads to lower match
probabilities for low and mid experience teachers in these markets. Due to the increased
search in bad schools, teachers of all types find greater chances of success in match-
ing with a good school. For example, mid experience teachers from bad schools are less
likely to be successful moving laterally by 3 percentage points but are more likely to be
successful moving to a good school by 4.8 percentage points.
The equilibrium distribution of teachers after this policy simulation yields modestly
favorable results. In particular, the number of mid and high experience teachers at bad










Table 8 Policy simulation results with utility of mid-experience teachers at bad schools increased by 20%
Simulation results Differences (Simulation results - base case)








N Mkt Entry γ kj,ko P
k
j,ko %N
Bad sch Good sch Bad sch Good sch Bad sch Good sch Bad sch Good sch
Low/bad 0.444 0.185 0.815 0.484 0.370 524.7 -0.037 0.073 -0.073 -0.052 0.023 0.055
Mid/bad 0.341 0.199 0.801 0.670 0.517 711.7 -0.103 0.075 -0.075 -0.031 0.048 0.066
High/bad 0.257 0.131 0.869 0.803 0.529 437.5 -0.073 0.018 -0.018 0.009 0.038 0.014
Low/good 0.357 0.433 0.567 0.366 0.626 2238.3 0.022 0.067 -0.067 -0.022 0.020 -0.022
Mid/good 0.341 0.210 0.790 0.542 0.633 3791.3 0.013 0.021 -0.021 -0.011 0.018 -0.012
High/good 0.239 0.050 0.950 0.683 0.648 3692.5 0.015 -0.017 0.017 0.033 0.005 -0.002




’ is the directed search probabilities of a representative teacher of type j, ko toward a school type k, conditional on




’ is the probability of a teacher of type j, ko successfully matching with a school type k, conditional on searching in that market.
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these schools increase by 5.5% as well. The unfilled vacancies at good schools are now
filled by newly minted teachers. Overall, increasing the desirability of bad schools seems
to be effective in moving and keeping experienced teachers to these schools. However, a
rough estimate of the cost of implementing such a policy state-wide shows that it would
most likely be prohibitively expensive. If we assume that teachers with 4 or more years
of experience would have to be offered an additional $8,000 to achieve these gains for
bad schools, this would cost the state of North Carolina approximately $65 million per
year36. As a comparison, the North Carolina state-wide pay-for-performance account-
ability system had an annual price tag of roughly $80 million. It was discontinued in
2009 due to funding difficulties despite support for the policy from parents, teachers,
and politicians. A policy designed to improve 15% of public schools, often at the cost of
poaching good teachers from other schools, would most likely find wide-spread support
lacking.
It must be acknowledged that the results of the simulations are for the short-run, as
entry and exit decisions are not a part of the theory model. As such, while it is tempting
to push the simulation to consider general equilibrium impacts of more robust, drastic
policy changes, the results from such policy simulations will most likely not hold in the
long-run, as teachers who are already in the market change their exit decision, and new
potential entrants change their behavior (resulting in a change in the number of entrants
overall as well as the number of teachers in each school type). I therefore examine a range
of policy changes that are not likely to have a large impact on long-term career decisions
of current and potential teachers37.
7 Conclusion
This study explored the decisions teachers and schoolsmake to search formatches, result-
ing in successful and unsuccessful teacher transfers. A fuller understanding of the transfer
market is especially important given the fact that roughly 10 to 20% of teachers turnover
each year, and first impressions of the teacher labor market that emerge from simple
summary statistics are misleading. Policies designed to direct teacher transfers toward a
more efficient or equitable outcome will have unintended consequences without a more
complete picture of the transfer market.
I showed that a teacher’s decision to enter the transfer market is driven by the expected
utility of matching (across all market types) as well as her professional characteristics. In
particular, experience level (between 4 to 10 years), advanced degrees, and certification
led to lower entry cost and a higher probability of searching. Better pre-service qualifica-
tions leading to more search confirms results from other studies. The high likelihood of
mid-career teachers searching indicates that teachers know when they are most desirable
to schools and choose to search for a new position before they become entrenched (and
moving costs become too high).
Conditional on searching, teachers evaluate the probability of finding a successful
match in each market conditional on their type and select their market optimally. Teach-
ers from both bad and good schools focus their search on good schools, with the notable
exception of low experience teachers from good schools, who divide their search effort
more evenly between good and bad schools. Originating from a good school and hav-
ing high experience is associated with being able to match with a good school, while a
teacher’s experience level is crucial in matching with a bad school. Teachers with low
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experience have a distinctly tougher time successfully matching with schools, either good
or bad.
Bad schools tend to target medium and highly experienced teachers from both bad
and good schools, while good schools search for experienced teachers originating from
good schools. The matching rate from the school side is relatively low across all teacher
types (with the exclusion of low experienced teachers), hinting at the possibility of a very
inefficient market.
Both bad and good schools have relatively high probabilities of matching with low
experienced teachers, yet they decide to shun these markets (although bad schools will
sometimes search for low experience teachers from good schools). The search pattern of
schools in light of the probability of match reveals why both types of schools behave in this
manner. Good schools simply focus on recruiting highly experienced teachers from good
schools because they have a high probability of finding their desired match. Bad schools
are indifferent bewteen low experienced teachers and newly minted teachers. Since the
outside option is guaranteed, many of these schools will attempt to match with a teacher
with more experience.
One significant characteristic that was not included in the model set up was whether
search was within district or across the entire state38. Boyd et al. (2002) showed that geo-
graphic distance is an important consideration for search on the teacher side. There may
also be institutional barriers in place to restrict inter-district hiring. This characteristic
was excluded due to computational reasons. Instead of one set of probability of search
and match by types, each district would require one set, making calculation intractable.
While accounting for intra or inter-district transfer would certainly change the parameter
estimates and probabilities, qualitative results are unlikely to change39.
Contrary to impressions that one may get from the summary statistics, there exists sig-
nificant labormarket volatility and search friction in the teacher transfermarket. It is clear
that teachers do not have an orderly, safe march up the quality ladder from bad to good
schools as they gain experience. There are significant numbers of teachers at all experi-
ence levels that move up to good schools, down to bad schools, or transfer to schools of
the same type as their origin. In addition, a significant portion of teachers and schools
search for, yet fail to find the right match due to high search friction.
A closer look at the teacher transfers reveals a volatile and complex labor market under-
neath the placid surface portrayed by the summary statistics. Yet at the same time, the
searching behavior of teachers and schools are consistent with those seen in other search
markets.
Policy simulations of simple interventions to prevent or slow down the movement of
teachers up the quality ladder without taking into account the general equilibrium impli-
cations of such government actions proved to be mostly ineffective. Direct intervention
to suppress movement of experienced teachers by closing a subset of the good school
market induced large increases in the number of relatively inexperienced teachers at bad
schools. Making bad schools more desirable does increase the number of experienced
teachers at these schools, but this policy carries a very high price tag. This points to the
conclusion that simplistic rule changes to redirect transfers will most likely be unsuccess-
ful in increasing efficiency or equity. To get experienced teachers to stay at ‘bad’ schools,
policy makers will have to change the characteristics of these schools that make them so
unattractive, which promises to be an expensive endeavor. Ultimately, while the outcome
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of simplistic policy interventions in the teacher transfer market will be, at best, opaque, it
is encouraging that insights gained from other matching labor markets will be applicable
to this market as well.
Endnotes
1Alternatively, it is possible that teachers are actually sorting themselves into more
productive positions (Jackson 2013).
2For example, the New Teacher Project. See Levin et al. (2005).
3Other examples of structural models in analyzing education issues include
Stinebrickner (2001) and van der Klauuw (2012).
4The assumption here is that once principals are not bound by the restrictive rule,
they will be able to pursue candidates that are the best fit for their school. Some
researchers and practitioners have gone further to consider firing of ineffective teachers.
See Hanushek (2010) to explore increases in test scores by replacing the worst teacher
with an average teacher. Michelle Rhee, former chancellor of the Washington D.C.
public school system fired over 200 low-performing teachers during her tenure. Some
focus has also been paid to the difficulty of getting rid of particularly ineffective
teachers. See Jacob (2010). Recently, a California court case ruled teacher tenure laws
deprived students the right to an equitable education, guaranteed under the state
Constitution. See Medina (2014).
5Some research has looked at response of new teachers to high wage as well as policy
experiments aimed at increasing retention through higher pay. See Murnane et al.
(1989), Rickman and Parker (1990), and Clotfelter et al. (2008).
6Seniority-status may not be portable across school districts.
7Monetary rewards are sometimes offered in the form of signing and retention
bonuses and recruiting drives for math and science teachers in hard-to-staff areas. See
Clotfelter et al. (2008).
8The economics literature has focused on identifying characteristics that proxy for
teacher quality, finding that experience, education level, and credentials are correlated
with higher student achievement (Goldhaber and Anthony 2007 and Rockoff 2004,
among many others). Research on accountability legislation such as the No Child Left
Behind Act and other state-specific programs have focused on the impact of introducing
market pressures to induce teachers and administrators to increase education output.
Market pressure may thus lead principals to compete for the ‘best’ teachers
(Ahn 2013).
9I remain agnostic about whether teachers themselves collectively impose centralized
matching (to benefit senior members, say); however, this appears unlikely. Teachers in
NC are prohibited by law from collectively bargaining with the state or districts
(Winkler et al. 2012).
10Boyd et al. (2011) has this information on the teacher side explicitly.
11See Fox (2010) for an example.
12See Arcidiacono et al. (2010) for a similar set up.
13If a teacher is indifferent between searching and not searching, I assume, with no
loss of generality, that she chooses not to search. Schools are never indifferent between
searching and not searching. If a teacher (school) is indifferent across more than one
type of school (teacher), search effort is equally distributed across indifferent types. If
more than one match results for a particular teacher or school, the match that yields the
highest utility for the entity with the multiple matches is observed in the data. If a
teacher has multiple matches and one of those matches is with a school that also has
multiple matches, the match must be pair-wise stable for it to observed in the data. See
Fox (2010) for a definition of pair-wise stability.
14Teachers answering that they plan to leave the profession are dropped from the
dataset. See section 3.5 for a justification.
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15Although I have a wealth of teacher and school characteristics, I use only a subset for
estimation purposes for tractability. See the estimation section for more details.
16Specifically, low-performing schools are categories: Low Performing and Priority
Schools. High-performing schools are categories: No Recognition, Schools of Progress,
Schools of Distinction, Schools of Excellence, and Honor Schools of Excellence. For
more detailed information about school categorizations, refer to: http://www.
ncreportcards.org/src/How2ReadSRC.pdf. From hereon, I label low-performing and
high-performing schools as bad and good schools, respectively.
17These are also the categories the state chooses to emphasize in school report cards.
For more detailed information, refer to: http://www.ncreportcards.org/src/
How2ReadSRC.pdf.
18The decision to search in the WCS is self-reported. It is possible that some teachers
were merely expressing frustration with their current position rather than a decision to
enter the transfer market. Estimating the model assuming only some fraction of declared
searchers actually search increases the probability of matching successfully from the
teacher-side (At the limit,the matching function becomes min{teachers, vacancies} and
probability of matching equals 1). Assuming all searching teachers identified in the WCS
actively search leads to a transfer success rate of approximately 60%, which is actually
higher than success rates reported elsewhere.
19An interesting result of defining the utility and the multinomial logit model in this
way is that there is no need to normalize one of the probabilities by setting one set of
choice parameters to zero. All that is required is to set one of the Ckj,ko to a constant.
20If some schools have a preference for new teachers over experienced teachers, this
would show up as an overestimation of all search probabilities from the school side in
the estimation.
21If search cost is actually different across school types, this would be reflected in the
search probability. γ would now be a combination of the probability of finding a match,
conditional on searching for a particular type of teacher, as well as the direct cost
differential (compared to searching for a base teacher type).
22In the estimation, I normalize μ0k = −1 for all k.
23I exclude new teachers’ entry decision because it makes no sense for ‘new’ teachers
to decide to forgo entry into the labor market.
24See Brewer (1996) or Dolton and van der Klauuw (1999).
25It is possible that some positions will remain unfilled, especially in poor inner-city
schools. In the model, this will mean that the number of vacancies in ‘bad’ schools is
under-counted, resulting in an overestimation of the probability of these schools
successfully matching with teachers.
26I was unable to use teacher fixed-effects as a characteristic due the inability of
assigning fixed-effects values to teachers at the (unconditional) search decision, where it
is impossible to directly link these teachers to the administrative data set.
27One other reason to use origin school type (‘bad’ or ’good’ school) is for practicality.
Because of the need to split searchers in discrete markets, using any other typical school
characteristic (% traditionally disadvantaged group for example) would require an
arbitrary cut off value to define markets. School category has the distinction of being a
form of segmentation that the state decided was important. In addition, while it is
possible to add in more teacher or school characteristics, each new variable
geometrically increases the number of markets to search over, greatly complicating the
estimation. For example, if a simple teacher minority status was added, this would
increase the number of teacher types to twelve. It is impossible to add a continuous
characteristic, as that would imply an infinite number of markets with no mass.
28If teachers are matched by a central authority according to a seniority rule, the
model would express this preference by over-estimating a good school’s utility from
matching with an experienced teacher. The higher utility would be consistent with more
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good schools choosing to search in the experienced teacher market, which in turn will
lead to a higher probability of good teachers successfully matching with good
schools.
29The elasticity of matching term α is structurally identified. However, estimation
allowing the term to float free yielded poor results. This most likely indicates that α may
differ by a) teacher and school types and b) characteristics on both sides of the market
that cannot be incorporated into the model, such as teacher/principal reputation or
effort in conducting the search.
30Bounding A above zero conveniently eliminates the need to worry about negative
match probabilities (P) yielding a valid search probability (γ ). As I defined in the model























) . Negative P’s, which are wrapped inside of
exponential functions will still lead to positive γ ’s.
31This group of teachers would be the only teachers who may not have the outside
option of remaining in their current school.
32Another possibility is that many schools are not allowed to recruit from the low
experience pool due to collective bargaining agreements.
33 See http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/fbs/finance/salary/schedules/2006-
07schedules.pdf for table of salaries used in the author’s calculation.
34 See http://cpre.wceruw.org/conference/nov04/cms04.pdf for the list and
descriptions of state and district specific bonus programs.
35Step-by-step instructions for both policy simulations are in the appendix.
36Assume that 15% of schools are designated as bad, 75% of teachers have 4+ years of
experience, and there are approximately 80,000 full-time public school teachers in the
state.
37It is also unlikely that drastic policies will have the political support to be
implemented.
38A strict interpretation of the model would mean that teachers and schools are
searching across the entire state.
39Estimation using a restricted sample (one large district: Charlotte-Mecklenburg)
looking at only within-district transfers yielded qualitatively similar results.
Appendix
Identification
Looking at the estimation, it is initially strange to note that there is no ‘excluded’ category
for the discrete choice model. For instance, teachers, conditional on searching, are really
making a binary choice between good and bad schools, yet there is a set of parameter esti-
mates for good school choice and bad school choice. The reasoning for this is as follows.
Note that usually, we have an excluded category because of an indeterminacy problem
in identifying the probabilities. That is, when we have a simple linear utility function of
individual i for choice k, we usually have:




Then, defining any β∗k = βk + α for any α leads to the same probabilities, as:
Pr(Yi = k|xi) = exp(x
′
i(βk + α))∑K
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Therefore, the convention is to set one of the choice specific parameters to zero, such
that:




However, note that in this model, I have an additional set of terms that enter that are
choice-specific that must be determined simultaneously with βko . Namely, the probability
of matching with a type of school. The (simplified) probability is:


















Applying the same logic as above, we have:
Pr(Yi = k|xi) =
exp
(















Since the vector of β∗ is now:
β∗ =
[










The α cannot be eliminated from the expression. Therefore, the probabilities are
uniquely identified without the usual zero restriction. Note that this is actually a necessity
in my model, as I need to predict the matching probabilities of all categories.
Explicit Derivation of Identification
For teachers, to simplify, there is only good (G) and bad (B) schools, and low experience


















































Therefore, all terms are identified. Similar logic follows for teachers of type (L,G),
(H ,B), and (H ,G).
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Therefore, once again, all terms are identified (except utility of matching with new
teachers).
Policy simulation instructions
Case 1: Decrease vacancies at good schools.
The simulation is conducted in the following way:
1. Total number of positions available for vacancies at good schools is decreased by
15 percent (Ok,new), which is roughly fraction of the number of teaching positions
in Charlotte-Mecklenburg over the total number of positions available.
2. Teacher search and utility parameters, school utility parameters, as well as
matching parameters are kept constant.







probabilities to generate the total number of searching





4. The teacher and school search probabilities (γ kj,ko and γ
j,ko
k , respectively), T̂kj,ko , and





5. The new match probabilities are used in the multinomial logit framework for






6. The new match and search probabilities are plugged into 3) to generate new





7. This process is repeated until difference between Tkj,ko from one iteration to the
next converges to some η where η → 0.
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Case 2: Increase the utility of matching with a bad school.
The simulation is conducted in the following way:
1. The constant term in the utility of matching with a bad school is decreased (in
absolute terms) by 20 percent.
2. The remaining teacher search and utility parameters, school utility parameters, as
well as matching parameters are kept constant.








probabilities to generate the total number of searching teachers





4. The teacher and school search probabilities (γ kj,ko and γ
j,ko
k , respectively), T̂kj,ko , and





5. The new match probabilities are used in the multinomial logit framework for






6. The new match and search probabilities are plugged into 3) to generate new





7. This process is repeated until difference between Tkj,ko from one iteration to the
next converges to some η where η → 0.
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